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INTRODUCTION
The problems connected with the reliability of large, complex electronic
systems have been the subject of much interest of late years and have been
dealt with in a large number of publications reporting theoretical investiga-
tions as well as conclusions based upon empirical failure data.  As these
studies are aimed at elucidating widely different problems, it is often very
difficult to judge whether the methods and results reported ar,e adequate for
the assessment of a particular actual system.
The first thorough investigations had their starting point in reliability
problems connected with military installations, and this origin and the
military capability aspects and mission-oriented tasks still leave their im-
press on the terminology and definitions in common use for the reliability of
electronic systems.
On acount of the tremendous development of electronic systems and their
use in industrial automatization, a need has arisen for increasingly efficient
methods of predicting the reliability of a large-scale electronic system at an
early stage of the development and design phase of the process plant as a
whole; for not only does automatization involve the possibility of expensive
consequences of failures in the electronic equipment, but the rapid devel-
opment of the numerous special applications makes operating experience
from existing plants an insufficient basis for evaluation.  The reliability of
industrial plants - apart from such in which failures may result in injury to
human beings - must be estimated from an economic analysis of normal
and abnormal operation, while the operational reliability standards devel-
oped for military installations are not directly applicable.  As to industrial
process plants the problem is to create a plant performing the desired func-
tion in the most economic way for a long period; in such plants maintenance
and repairs are usually possible.  Therefore the economic penalties of the
different failure types determine, what precautions are economically justifi-
able, and so a detailed analysis of the various possible failures is required.
Also in this respect industrial plants differ from military installations, mis-
sile and aircraft equipment, which are desired to perform a particular func-
tion faultlessly for a given - often rather short - period during which repairs
are out of the question.  Here a, more detailed classification of failure possi-
bilities is often of no interest.
For the reliability of a plant to be estimated in advance, regard must be
paid both to gradual changes in the components and the influence of the
environment and to radical changes of a statistical nature caused by com-
ponent faults.  This requires mathematical descriptions of the failure
mechanisms as well as information about the nature and frequency of the
failures, and much work is done all over the world to develop suitable mod-
els and collect failure statistics.  In the preparation of mathematical de-
scriptions of actual plants it is necessary to make a great number of simpli-
fying assumptions, and existing failure statistics are usually most imperfect;
therefore endeauvours to evaluate the reliability in advance often give rise to
great scepticism.
Although it is not possible with any great certainty to calculate the reli-
ability of a plant beforehand, and is not likely to become possible in a period
seeing a rapid development of components and plants, the value of a sys-
tematic assessment based on simplified models and inadequate failure sta-
tistics should not be underestimated; for such assessment may often effi-
ciently call attention to weak points in the system and its mode of operation
and may further present a reasonable choice between alternative designs
and countermeasures against the more important sources of failure.
SYSTEM
In the following we shall consider a system, mechanical, chemical, electri-
cal or economic, which produces an output (a product or state) from an in-
put (raw materials, power forms, etc.) under the influence of a control sig-
nal.  These three quantities may all be multidimensional.
The output will be subject to quantitative or qualitative specifications, and
the system is considered reliable when the specifications are met in an eco-
nomically satisfactory way.  Thus the system may sometimes fail to meet the
specifications and still be reliable if countermeasures against failures are
feasible and the economic losses are of minor importance compared with the
total process economy and balanced with the cost of gaining a lower failure
rate by a more conservative design.
The output is related to the input by a law, the transfer function of the
system, whose parameters may be varied by means of a control signal.
Of course it is only possible to estimate the economic consequences of
failures for an actual plant, and even for that often in coarse outline only
since such estimation must be largely based on an evaluation of the prob-
ability of occurrence and the duration of failures.  However, it will normally
be necessary to establish limits to the consequences one is willing to tolerate
in the case of failures, and these limits provide an important basis for the
design of the system.
In the present discussion, failures can therefore only be divided into cer-
tain characteristic classes.
A class apart is constituted by failures that may cause injury to persons.
An economic evaluation of this class of failures and of expedient counter-
measures has been attempted by several investigators 1), but is unrealistic
for so small an economic unit as a single plant or enterprise.  An evaluation
should ensure that the risks connected with the plant do not contribute to
the general hazards of the operators, but it must be taken into account that
excessive protection against the factors that are under control may increase
the unknown risk from factors not under control.
An important type of failure from an economic point of view is plant fail-
ures resulting in large once-for-all expenses every time they occur, for in-
stance costs of repairs for damage to the plant.  Such failures most often
interfere abruptly and radically with the operation of the plant, and in esti-
mating the extent of countermeasures the frequency of the failures is clearly
the decisive factor.  This type of failure is evidently characterized by mani-
festing itself to the operating staff, when it occurs.
Other failures cause increased working expenses, depending mainly on
their duration, e. g. in connection with losses due to less economical pro-
duction, products of poor quality or increased possibility of more compre-
hensive damage to the plant during thc-, period in which the failures are
present.  These failures do not always manifest themselves when the occur;
they may be due to minor and gradual changes in the plant, and what mat-
ters is not their frequency, but their integrated duration.
Thus, for a reliability assessment it does not suffice to add up the failure
frequencies of the various components; the influence of the individual fail-
ures on the overall economy must be estimated.  The principal difficulty is
that such estimates in most cases necessitate component failure statistics
showing a far more detailed distribution on failure types than those made
to-day.  An open circuit fault in a simple component such as an electric re-
sistor may have an effect on the total plant essentially different from that of
a short circuit, and while it is possible to find applicable figures for the total
failure frequency of the resistor, it may be necessary to resort to pure con-
jecture as far as the distribution is concerned.
According to their effects on the performance of the plant, failures may be
divided into three categories:
The first category comprises failures caused by an input to the system of
false information which, being treated in the same way as the genuine in-
formation, causes deviations from the specifications of the output.  This
group may include influences from the environment of the plant in the form
of e. g. heat, induced noise voltages and variations in supply as well as com-
ponent failures.
The second category consists of failures that bring about parametric
changes in the transfer function of the system, such as variations in gain
and wear phenomena.  Like those of the first type, these failures may be due
to outside influences as well as component changes.
The third category is constituted by failures that give rise to structural
changes in the system involving an alteration of the form of the transfer
function, for instance interruption of information channels or establishment
of new false couplings; mechanical ruptures, and saturation phenomena.
This category comprises a number of failure types that may be regarded as
excessive parameter variations.  On the whole, the limits between the cate-
gories are undefined.
One and the same component failure may give rise to - possibly simulta-
neous - system failures within two or more of these categories.
This, however does not affect the fundamental classification as applied in
the following considerations.
The discussion of countermeasures will only comprise the technical pos-
sibilities of obtaining a reliable process in spite of unreliable components
and disturbances from the surroundings; the trivial possibility of improving
reliability by choosing better components and surroundings is left out of
consideration.
DIRECT CONTROL
In its simple form the process system may be depicted by the block dia-
gram below:
The diagram illustrates a process that converts an input (often multidi-
mensional) to the desired output under a controlling influence based on the
desired specifications.  A condition for the practical applicability of this sim-
ple scheme, which shows the directly controlled process, is that the relation
specification - control - output is sufficiently unique - so that the designer
may predetermine the entire process in every detail.  This will only be so
when the process is based on simple fundamental laws unaffected by dis-
turbances.
In designing a process plant one naturally endeavours to base the process
on an inherently reliable law, but the fact that the choice of process depends
very much on operation economy will greatly influence the range of selec-
tion.
Since a process permitting direct control must be governed by simple and
stable laws, the control possibilities are often very limited and the specifica-
tions of the output therefore incorporated in the system itself by the de-
signer.
By way of example may be mentioned machine tools, with automatic
stamping machines as an extreme.
Where the process cannot be based on a law so unfailing that the desired
output can be obtained by direct control, compliance with the specifications
must be ensured by continous measurement of the output.
FEEDBACK
For measurements to make any sense, the result,-, must be compared
with the specifications, and on the basis of this comparison the process
must be controlled by means of suitable signals.
The synthesis of control signals may take place in an automatic control
device or through the action of an operator in manually controlled plants.
Either case may be illustrated by a block diagram of a feedback system:
For the purpose of the fundamental discussion we shall here impose the
restriction that we look upon the static properties, i. e, that the speeds of
variation are so low that the operation is not influenced by the dynamics of
the system.
Obviously a satisfactory reliability depends upon a reliable measurement
of the specified properties of the output, that is a reliable conversion from a
property of the output to a signal, a representation in the instrument system
and conversion from the specification to a representation.  If it is possible,
by means of the control input, to counteract all changes of the output signal
due to false signals and parametric changes throughout the variation range,
the influence of such changes on the output may be kept within the speci-
fied limits provided the sensitivity of the control input is adjusted to the sig-
nal level obtained by the comparison between measured value and specifi-
cation.  In other words, the gain and the dynamic range must be sufficiently
large. (Systems utilizing this technique thoroughly in practice are referred to
in parts of the modern literature 2) as "high-gain adaptive systems").  Thus
instrumentation improves the reliability where the process relation 'specifi-
cation Æ control signal Æ output' is less unique and reliable than the oppo-
site relation that may be utilized in a control system: 'output Æ specification
Æ control signal'.
The great possibilities of improving the reliability of complex processes by
the use of instrumentation are due to the fact that in the instrumentation
there is a very considerable liberty of choice both of the physical system
used as instrumentation and of a variable as representation in this system
that physically deviates substantially from possible disturbances.  One may
choose among electrical, pneumatic and mechanical systems; in electrical
systems the representation may be D. C. or A. C. signals, pulse-modulated
voltages, etc.; and the representation may be analogue - or digital-coded.
As appears from the above, planning of process plant and instrumenta-
tion as a whole may be decisive for the reliability as a comparison is re-
quired between the possibilities of choosing inherently reliable laws in the
process and in the measuring equipment.  Minor changes in the specifica-
tion may often decide the choice of system.
To illustrate this we may take a simple system designed to keep a tem-
perature constant . Looking for E. simple law that ensures a constant tem-
perature, we may naturally think of 0 and 1000 in the centigrade scale. if
100 0 C is a useful temperature, and the variations in the boiling point of
water at normal barometric variations are within the specifications, simple
direct control is possible in the form of an open water bath, the only purpose
of the control being to ensure a sufficient supply of power.
Even a minor alteration of the specifications may lead to difficulties.  If
e.g. 900 C is desired constant temperature, it cannot be immediately en-
sured by any simple law.  The temperature is here directly dependent on the
power supply, the temperature of the surroundings, etc., and it is necessary
to investigate whether measurement and regulation are the most advanta-
geous method.
This necessitates another physical system that permits a unique conver-
sion of the temperature and the reference to a new variable, suited to control
the power supply, in this system.  It is well known both that such a system
can be provided and that an expedient representation is possible in both
electrical, pneumatic and mechanical systems.
The specification and the output are usually multidimensional, the output
being characterized by several specified parameters, which may be mutually
related by their dependence on a superior specification.  If the individual
specified parameter can be measured directly, and if they can be controlled
independently of the others by a suitable signal, the system may be regarded
as a number of independent elementary control loops.
However, this is usually not the case.  Often the specified property cannot
be measured directly by sufficiently simple method.-,; instead a calculation
must be made, based on measurement of secondary properties.  Moreover, a
close coupling may exist between the effects of the various control signals on
the output parameters.  In these and other cases the control signals must
be based on a more complicated combination of the representations of
measured data and specifications in the instrumentation.  It is important to
emphasize again, from the point of view of reliability, that any law utilized
for the conversion of measured data and specifications into representations
in the system and for calculations on these representations until the com-
parison is made must be qualitatively and quantitatively reliable, while laws
utilized for operation on the signals after the comparison are only subject to
qualitative requirements.
The reliability demands on -the functions of measuring and specification
do not immediately apply to subsystems that measure and formulate secon-
dary specifications if the final main specification is controlled by a higher-
level feedback loop.  As control input such a loop may often advantageously
use the specification or reference input of a lower-level loop, whereby the
demands on the reliability of the functions of measuring and specification in
the lower-level loop are eased.  In many actual plants this superior control is
carried out by the operator.
Such division into lower-and higher-level loops may be necessary, both
because the state of operation of the plant depends on a number of technical
factors not directly related to the primary output specifications, and because
these specifications may necessitate evaluation of the output during a longer
period , for instance for the purpose of economic optimalization, and thus
give no information about the required immediate control signals.
The block diagram of the system is now as follows:
In large plants the designer is ofted presented with a choice between
automatizing the superior control function, which requires clear, objective
and detailed specifications, and leaving this control to an operator; in the
latter case the control may be based on more loosely defined specifications
formulated during the training and instruction of the operator.
Under normal operation conditions the operator is thus part of a feedback
loop and may continually correct his controlling actions on the basis of the
result.  After the training period the designer's instruction - apart from the
continuous up-dating of the operation specifications - will therefore be of
negligible importance and be replaced by the operator's experience.  The op-
erator's role in the system will be well defined, and his properties may be
established on the basis of experiments and experience from other plants
with human operators,
As discussed later, this does not apply to the operator's sole under ab-
normal conditions.
It is as true of the measuring and specification equipment in the instru-
mentation as of the process itself that if it is not possible to utilize a simple
and reliable law for the conversion one way, e. g. from measured value to
representation, the possibility may exist of utilizing a simple law describing
the opposite conversion.  If the function of amplification is sensitive to the
parameters, the more stable attenuation may be utilized in a feedback;
where measurements are more sensitive than direct control, the latter is
used in a compensating measurement.,
Outside the measurement/specification function the reliability problem is
thus eased by the fact that only a qualitative relation is required between
control signals and output.  This means, however, that in this simple system
the instrumentation does not compensate for structural failures, which
disturb just the qualitative relation.  Failures manifesting themselves as
parametric variations ("multiplicative failures") are counteracted regardless
of their location in the system (still provided it is outside the measurement/
specification function in a higher-level loop), and it is well known that their
effect depends only on the "loop gain".  False information is an "additive fail-
ure", whose effect may be assessed by conversion into an equivalent error in
the specification.  The effect of the feedback on this failure type is implied in
the possibility of altering the conversion factor in the design of the system
and the positioning of the it gain" in the loop.
On the above-mentioned static assumptions, all failures resulting in
parametric changes outside the measurement/ specification system may
thus be counteracted by a sufficiently high gain.  The only demand on the
process is that it is possible to control the specified properties of the output
through the control input.
DYNAMIC PROPERTIES
The much simplifying static assumption does usually not hold, for the
control signals will have no immediate effect on the output because of time
constants or delays in the process, and the memory in the system expressed
by the time constant ("energy accumulator 11) makes the state of the system
dependent on its past history.  Therefore the control signals normally de-
pend, not only on the immediate value of the output, but also on the past
history of the system.
In some cases, for instance when pure time delays occur, the system may
be improved by combining feedback with direct control, the control signals
being calculated on the basis of direct measurements of the input and the
other influences.  Such direct control is sensitive to disturbances, but any
faults in the control signals will be corrected by the feedback.
Thus the control signals normally have to be modified in a compensator
dimensioned by the designer to give the necessary time correction.  The di-
mensioning will be based on knowledge of the process and its dynamics and
on a specification of the response of the output to transient effects.
The time correction in the compensator is in the nature of direct control,
being conditional upon accordance between the dynamic properties of the
process and the model of them constituted by the compensator, as well as
between the designer's dimensioning criterion and the influences to which
the process is exposed.  The properties of the output under transient condi-
tions will thus depend on parametric variations in the process as well as the
compensator unless a higher-level loop controls the parameters in the com-
pensator and/or the process on the basis of a measurement of the transient
properties and a corresponding specification.
In most automatized plants to-day this control is exercised by the opera-
tor who adjusts the compensators as required; in this way the need for an
objective specification of the transient properties is to a certain degree elimi-
nated.  In plants with great parameter variations, and in the case of in-
creasing automatization, the control must be taken over by the higher-level
loop; in many cases this will present a problem, at the design stage, of es-
tablishing an appropriate specification of the transient properties and a
suitable measuring method.
It is the wish to be able to control a process with greatly varying or poorly
defined parameters that has given rise to the intensive. studies of adaptive
and optimalizing systems carried out of late year,,.  In these investigations
little attention has been paid to parameter variation.- in the instrumentation
itself.  From this point of view the most promising systems seem to be those
in which the instrumentation does not comprise a model of the process, but
information about the I:ast history of the system is gained by extensive di-
rect measurement of the state of the process, and the control signals are
made from an optimalization on the basis of constant "experimenting" with
the process and of an objective specification of the desired properties.
As mentioned above, the feedback principle as currently applied has no
correcting influence on the consequences of such structural failures as deci-
sively change the performance of the plant.  On the contrary, the effect of
structural failures that open a feedback loop may be aggravated since the
high gain characteristic of feedback systems may drive the system to one of
the limits of the dynamic range.  Structural failures usually manifest them-
selves in sudden changes of the performance of the system, but may have
widely different physical causes: wear (e. g. mechanical breakdown) gradual
change of electric components (e. g. stop of oscillator), noise pulses (change
of programme in digital computer), and abrupt failures in electric compo-
nents.
The normal procedure in the case of a structural failure is to stop the pro-
cess in response to a failure indication, search for the failure and carry out
repairs.  In the majority of cases the best countermeasure is therefore the
installation of an efficient monitoring system to detect failures, protect the
plant and assist the staff in locating failures.
The above-mentioned procedure may be inadequate in plants with a great
reaction speed.  Here it may be profitable to introduce alternative operation
possibilities by duplicating equipment for particular critical operations.
To be efficient such duplication, which may be effected on component
subsystem or system level, must be based on a detailed analysis of the plant
and its operational and maintenance procedures.  Especially it is important
that there is no coupling between a unit and its duplicate so that failures
may affect them both simultaneously (for instance there must be no possi-
bility of damaging all cables in a doubled information channel at the same
time).  By failure indication or routine inspections it must be ensured that
failures are detected and repaired in the individual doubled units soon after
occuring, seeing that the mean interval between failures in a redundant
system, where repairs are not made till system failures occur, may be con-
siderably smaller than that for the individual 3) channels constituting the
system
In the process plant itself doubling is often an expensive affair as com-
pared with the resulting sawings in costs of repairs and loss of profits; in
large process plants doubling of certain critical units in the instrumentation
system may be necessary.
In traditional instrument systems, the functioning of each component and
unit has been carefully planned by the designer.  The system is therefore
very sensitive to structural failures, and under normal operating conditions
doubled equipment will be superfluous (redundant).
This is true especially of the units connecting the process with the in-
strumentation via measuring units (transducers) and control units (actua-
tors).  As regards the part of the instrumentation that calculates the control
signals from the measured data, recent investigations on self-learning data
processing systems seem to point to a possibility in principle of building up
system of uniform units whose functions and mutual couplings may be in-
fluenced by appropriate control signals derived from an -evaluation of the
working results of the plant.  If the units are sufficiently general in their
functions and their number in the system sufficiently large (micro-
electronics), the duplication or redundancy principle may be radically util-
ized, and rapid repairs to failing units will be unnecessary.  An interesting
property of such systems will be that the functioning units may at any time
be utilized in the best possible way so that gradually accumulating failures
do not lead to a radical change of the functioning, but to a slow degradation
of its quality (graceful degradation).  Of course this principle is of most in-
terest in systems that cannot be repaired; the preliminary investigations re-
ported therefore naturally deal with missile and satellite equipment.
Some reported investigations of self-learning control systems for process
plants have been concerned with the control of processes with poorly de-
fined properties and influences.  In the nature of things such systems are
well adapted to face failures and unintended variations in the process plant,
but in their design little attention has, as mentioned been paid to failures in
the control equipment.
Instrument systems based on a great number of uniform units are clearly
decentralized, the necessary functioning types being distributed over the
system.  A structural failure will therefore affect only a very limited part of
the total functioning (in self-learning systems even only during the re-
training period).  In greatly centralized systems, represented particularly by
computer systems, in which all functions of the same kind are performed in
the same circuits - all memory is concentrated in the ferrite memory, all de-
cisions are made by the same arithmetic unit,, etc. - the desired functions of
the system are specified to the smallest detail in circuits and programme,
and failures in a single circuit may greatly affect a large number of opera-
tions.  This system design is thus fundamentally very sensitive to structural
failures - and to parameter variation, and false information leading to
structural changes through programme disturbances.  That such systems
may be very reliable in practice is due to other factors; the digital represen-
tation in itself makes the system insensitive to a number of types of false
information and to parameter variations in the basic circuits; the high data
processing speed makes it possible - with rather little equipment - to solve
problems whose solution would otherwise be unrealistic in practice because
of the amount - and thus unreliability - of the conventional equipment
needed; last, but not least, the fact that the operation required for a special
purpose may be based on a programme stored in mass produced equipment
means that the risk of unreliability involved in the use of tailored special
equipment is avoided.
The self-learning control systems offer an interesting possibility of solving
the reliability problems arising where it is difficult to formulate the func-
tional specifications of the plant in a way that may be utilized in a conven-
tional control system.  Here it is possible to control the structure and pa-
rameters of the system through a higher-level good-bad comment on its
functioning.
The considerations above are concerned with instrumentation systems,
but apply to other systems as well, social and economic for instance.  In or-
ganizational discussions we recognize the concepts specification of purpose,
rmasurement of result, choice between ordered and goal determined func-
tions, and choice between centralized and decentralized structures.
MONITORING AND SAFETY SYSTEMS
Only in very few instrumented process plants is it possible in the long run
to obtain satisfactory reliability - that is satisfactory, or optimal, operational
economy - alone by means of instrumentation and operator in a reversible
control function.  The sensitivity of the system to structural failures will
generally in itself necessitate a monitoring system.  The latter here means a
system that controls part specifications of the output or internal variables of
the process plant, and which - automatically or via the operator - may es-
tablish a safe state of operation of the plant when these variables are found
to have values indicating a hazardous state of operation.
The functions of the monitoring system differ on essential points from
those of the normal process instrumentation.  The purpose of the latter is to
control - continuously and reversibly, in a closed loop - a process in such a
way that measured properties of the output correspond to the specifications.
As discussed above, the reliability of this control depends closely on the self
-healing effect in a feedback loop; the system, as it were, feels its way and is
able reversibly to adjust its effect on the process to its experience with re-
spect to the result.
The monitoring system, on the other hand, is designed to protect the
plant against rare events, radical failures in the plant infrequent outer influ-
ences, and unusual combinations of minor failures.  The system measures
selected quantities in the plant and compares the results - or quantities cal-
culated from the results - with the specified limits.  Under normal condi-
tions, i. e. when the limits are not exceeded, the system has no influence on
the operation of the plant.  Only when the limits are exceeded does a signal
from the system induce a correcting action (automatic or via the operator).
The system has no influence on the further course of this correction, that i,-
., it cannot cancel it if it has an inexpedient effect.  The characteristic
monitoring system is thus a pronounced "open-loop" system, incapable of
"feeling its way".  On account of its irreversible nature, the intervention of
the system will usually have great consequences for the operation, and the
problem of reliability will be marked by the resulting high decision level in
the system.
Monitoring systems range from simple systems in which just one physical
quantity is measured and the system, in the case of exceeding of a fixed
limit, gives an alarm signal and automatically stops the process, to compli-
cated plants in which a great number of quantities are measured -and, after
advanced processing of the data collected, a choice is made, possibly by an
operator, between a number of corrective actions in accordance with the
situation.
Because of the discrete nature of the functioning of the system, failures in
the system cannot be expediently divided into information, parametric and
structural failures; they must be classified solely according to the corre-
sponding corrective action and according to whether they induce this action
at the wrong time (Tail to safe") or block it when it ought to set in ("fail to
unsafe").
The reliability of the monitoring system is thus characterized by the fre-
quency of unwanted interference with the operation and the corresponding
loss of profits caused by failures in the instrumentation, and by the dura-
tion of failures blocking its protection of the process plant, measured e.g. by
the "dead time" (i. e. the relative integrated time during which it is blocked)
and the connected economic risk.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE MONITORING SYSTEM
By measurement the monitoring system collects information about the
state of the plant.  Then, by data processing it detects possible failures in
the bounds and relations that govern this information in normal operation.
If an abnormal situation is detected, the cause of the failure is identified, the
failing component is localized, a decision is made about a suitable counter-
measure, and the countermeasure is put into effect.  For the decision to be
made, extensive information i,- required which cannot be obtained by meas-
urement on the plant, but must be incorporated in the functioning of the in-
strumentation by the designer or imparted to an operator through training
and instruction.  The functions of the monitoring system may therefore be
illustrated by the block diagram below:
In how far it is possible to monitor the operation and identify causes of
failures by processing of the measured data is determined by the extent of
the measurements.  In the choice of measuring parameters regard must be
paid to the fact that the measurements are to serve for monitoring not only
of the process plant, but of the measuring equipment itself.  While continu-
ous measuring channels are currently tested by the normal operation, the
same is not true of measuring channels with a threshold value that causes
them to function only in certain operational situations.  To ensure the func-
tions of these channels, special measures must be taken in the form of
regular testing with a simulated signal, possibly combined with an appropri-
ate kind of duplication.
By doubling a measuring channel that transmits measured data continu-
ously one merely increases the redundancy in the measured information,
which is in any case necessary for the detection and localization of failures
from the measurements.  However, the demand on the duplicated informa-
tion is so simple - the measured results must be equal - that the identifica-
tion of failures in these channels requires only simple equipment in the data
processing unit.
In doubling discontinuously acting measuring channels one must bear in
mind that such doubling will only serve the intended purpose if carefully
planned since the design of the system as well as the testing and repair pro-
cedures used have a decisive influence on the reliability. At worst, doubling
may reduce the reliability of the system. 3)
The normal state of operation of the plant is defined by the designer, and
the relations governing the measurement data in normal operation are es-
tablished during the design and commissioning.  In addition to the meas-
ured data, information about these relations is necessary for the data proc-
essing connected with failure detection.  Where an operator is to be respon-
sible for the detection of failures, the designer must make sure, by training
and instruction, that the operator has the required knowledge, which he
may up-date from his operational experience.  In view of the limited ability of
the human operator to remember detailed data accurately and, especially to
pay constant attention during long periods of normal operation, it is desir-
able to exonerate him from this task.  Further, as the designer can usually
provide a covering definition of the normal state of operation, automatization
of the failure detection is a most realistic measure, as indicated by the wide-
spread use of effective alarm systems.  The role of the operator will then be
that of a supervisory monitor, and with a suitable display system at his dis-
posal he will be well adapted to play it because he can draw on this normal
operating experience.
Identification of failures and decisions about action present much more
complex problems.  What is required here is not only measurement data,
but comprehensive information about the reactions of the plant and their
consequences in connection with a vast number of different failures and
failure combinations in the process plant as well as the instrument system.
Faced with the identification and decision problem, the de signer may ei-
ther foresee actual failure -ituations and incorporate detailed identification
and action procedures in the instrument system, or he may impart the nec-
essary information to the operator at a higher level by giving him, through
training and formulated instruction, a thorough understanding of the nature
of the plant and its response to abnormal situations.  As both possibilities
have pronounced advantages and drawbacks, it is natural that we here find
the most complicated cooperation between operator and instrumentation.
As the identification and decision function is of a markedly discrete na-
ture, its reliability will depend on the testing procedures used as a safeguard
against failures that may block the system (fail to unsafe).  As to the in-
struction system, testing in the form of exercises is as necessary as testing
of the automatic functions of the instruments This is so because in well-
designed plants it is just the very hazardous failure situations that have a
low probability of occurrence, and the corresponding instructions and pro-
cedures may therefore degenerate unless they are kept alive by exercises.
FULLY AUTOMATIC MONITORING SYSTEMS
Incorporation into the instrument system of failure identification as well
as decision and action may be necessary for plants subject to particularly
hazardous situations in which an operator has too long a reaction time and,
on the whole, 'too small a reliability.
Where it is possible to define a safe condition to which the plant may be
brought in any circumstances through automatic action, the safety action
can be automatized.  To cover all situations such intervention must usually
be of a radical nature, for instance an emergency stop, and strict reliability
demands therefore attach to the decision on which it is based.  Conse-
quently the designer must base his classification of the failure situations
concerned on a simple criterion so that he can make sure that his classifi-
cation is correct and can automatize the decision and action by means
whose reliability may be assessed beforehand.
For hazardous plants these requirements often lead to safety systems that
monitor selected parameters in the plant individually by means of redun-
dant measuring channels and automatically close down the plant when a
fixed limit for any of these parameters is exceeded.  In such plants the deci-
sion is simple; therefore reliability models may be made that allow evalua-
tion in advance of the effects of "fail-safe" dimensioning, of duplication a
more advanced redundant couplings and of different maintenance and test-
ing procedures.
To-day such models exist particularly for relay systems and certain types
of semiconductor logic in which failures are attributable almost exclusively
to faulty information to the decision function, the decision logic being con-
tained in the cabling structure.  For the majority of semiconductor logic cir-
cuits it is still difficult to work out models because failures in the semicon-
ductor elements lead to often complicated and unforeseeable failures in the
decision logic. 3)
It is usually necessary to make a quantitative assessment of safety sys-
tems on the basis of failure statistics for the components used since the re-
liability demands on the total system will correspond to a failure frequency
so low that it cannot be verified by testing within a reasonable time.
Because of the radical interference with the operation by such a safety
system and the economic consequences, it must only enter into operation
when absolutely required.  Therefore it is normally necessary to supplement
it by a system based on a much more differentiated classification of the fail-
ure possibilities and a corresponding group of control actions whose effects
on the operation correspond to the importance of the failure types.  As the
frequency of the more radical control actions may thus be reduced, the op-
eration of the plant will be less affected.
However, the much more complicated decision and action require more
comprehensive and hence more vulnerable equipment, which further means
that it is more difficult to evaluate the reliability in advance.  At the same
time the designer will have greater difficulties in giving a covering classifica-
tion of the relevant possibilities of failure, their operational consequences
and their data patterns for use in the desire of an automatic decision func-
tion.
The uncertainty of the designer's classification is to some extent counter-
acted by the fact that a missing or incorrect control action at a low level may
give rise to a more effective control action later in the development of the
failure situation.  For a similar security to be obtained against failures in the
more comprehensive data processing required in the decision function there
must be a reasonable degree of independence between the equipment used
for the different types of action.  In the case of a fairly detailed classification
such separation is impossible, alone on account of the internal coupling
between the individual failure patterns, and the data processing capacity re-
quired for large plants is so great that it may pay economically to use a
digital computer.
For these reasons a monitoring system with a highly differentiated influ-
ence on the operation of the process plant may be so vulnerable as to neces-
sitate an alternative monitoring possibility.  It may be obtained either by
comb:L-iinl the system with a higher-level, more simple and independent
safety system or, in the system itself, by co-operation of several digital com-
puters.  The latter choice may soon be made attractive by the price develop-
ment taking place for small computers.  Another possibility, often suggested,
is to introduce automatic testing equipment for the monitoring system,
which may secure the process when it detects failures in the monitoring
function.  In many cases, however, this simply means that the reliability
problem is transferred to the testing equipment.
For differentiated automatic changes in the state of operation of the proc-
ess plant - as countermeasures - to be possible, the normal control equip-
ment must in most cases be capable of controlling the plant during changes
beyond the normal operational range.  The intervention may then take the
form of a change of references in the control equipment provided the failures
are not located in this equipment.  Thus it is expedient also for this reason
to have decentralized control equipment.
In view of the problem it is for the designer at the present stage of devel-
opment of automatization to make in advance a sufficiently detailed analysis
of the response of the process plant to possible failure situations, the deci-
sion in the monitoring system for the more differentiated kinds of interven-
tion in the operation is usually left to an operator.
Irrespective of the intervention being automatic or manual, rapid and
automatic localization of the failure may be an advantage since the localiza-
tion that is a condition for repairs may be difficult and time consuming once
the intervention has altered the state of operation.
MONITORING BY THE OPERATOR
For the reasons indicated in the foregoing, the monitoring of a process
plant is usually arranged as follows.  A rather simple automatic safety in-
stallation controls a few selected parameters and secures the operation by
radical intervention such as emergency stop when a few well defined and
hazardous situations arise in the plant.  As regards the more differentiated
monitoring, instrumentation detects the abnormal conditions, and an op-
erator evaluates the situation and decides the action to be taken.
The decisive advantage of an operator is his ability, in a failure situation,
of generating detailed information himself by virtue of his understanding of
the nature and mode of operation of the plant.  His greatest disadvantage is
that his reaction speed and information capacity are limited. Further he may
be unreliable in his decision., being apt to base it on his everyday opera-
tional experience; thus he may, as shown by experience, interpret a compli-
cated failure situation as a coincidence of more trivial and frequent failures,
e. g. instrument failures, while serious, but rarely occurring situations
ought to be given absolute priority in his assessment.
These drawbacks of the human operator may to a very great extent be off
set by the design of the means of communication between operator and in-
struments and by an appropriate data reduction in the instrumentation.
Likewise, the instructions and training, which, as it were, programme the
operator for his intended functions, have a great influence on the reliability
of his decisions.
The operator's limited input capacity for detailed data must be efficiently
utilized.  This means that the information to be imparted to him in an ab-
normal situation must be coded in such a way as to enable him quickly to
survey the operational situation.  For the decision he is in need of a quick
estimate of the relation between sets of data rather than of accurate individ-
ual data; in this situation an appropriate coding will be in the analogue
form, graphs that show the relevant relation directly.  Through a suitable
display arrangement, including e. g. display on a picture screen (cathode-ray
tube), the resigner may make sure that the operator pays attention, in his
evaluation and decision, to selected and covering sets of data.  However, the
designcr must not prevent the operator from having access to selected and
accurate data for the evaluation of unforeseen situations.  Such access is
immediately possible in conventional instrument systems with simultaneous
display on many instruments; in the case of --cmputer-controlled display
the operator must have the same easy access to detailed data, for instance
by means of a light pen in connection with the survey displays in cathode-
ray tubes mentioned above.
In view of the uncertainty of the operators decision the designer will find it
attractive to utilize the, data-processing and storage capacity available in
digital computers to support the understanding of an abnormal situation
which the operator ought to have from his instructions, but which may not
be present to his mind.  This can be done by an automatic analysis of
measured data and a comparison with data patterns for a classification of
foreseeable failure situations worked out by the designer.
It is hardly expedient to work out this analysis in the same way as if
automatic intervention in the operation were the aim, that is so that it ends
in the selection of a detailed failure situation and in a direction to the op-
erator as to the appropriate countermeasure.  That the designer wants the
operator's assistance and evaluation of the situation may be due to a feeling
that his functional analysis in uncertain, and if the automatic analysis is
made in such a way as to point selectively at the most probable cause of
failure, it may block the awareness and inventiveness of the operator, the
very qualities it is desirable to utilize.
If the operator is wanted to make the decision he must feel qualified and
responsible, not a mere link in an automatic procedure.  Therefore the
automatic analysis should support his natural method of work, that is, it
should be used for an examination of the more trivial failure possibilities of
which, as the most probable, the operator will first think in a given situa-
tion.  If the results of this analysis are quickly and clearly presented to him
in more serious situations, he will the sooner turn his attention towards
more complex and hazardous possibilities.  It is essential that the communi-
cation to the operator is clear and efficient, which is achievable by appropri-
ate design of conventional alarm tableaus.  In the case of computer-
controlled display, textual information on a screen will be more suitable
than information by typewriting or table printing.
In designing instrument systems for complicated process plants the de-
signer is thus faced with the choice of counteracting an abnormal opera-
tional situation by incorporating automatic protective intervention in the in-
strumentation system or by ensuring correct intervention on the part of the
operators through training and instruction.  This choice is rendered difficult
especially by the very limited general knowledge of the reliability of opera-
tors' decisions and the possibility of improving it by advanced data process-
ing in the instrument system, and further by the shortage of generally for-
mulated knowledge of the reliability of instruction systems.
Therefore the change in the structure and functions of instrument sys-
tems that is made possible by digital computers, with their great flexibility
and data capacity, must rely on a realistic formulation of the tasks and
properties of systems and operators based on the knowledge implicit in the
tradition that has developed for more conventional instrument systems.  The
use of the digital computer in automatization must therefore not be in the
nature of a break of the more conventional tradition, but must be a harmo-
nious development on a technological basis with greater possibilities.
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